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CHEN ZHOU CHAI v. CARROLL
48 E3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
I. FACTS
Chen Zhou Chai ("Chen"), a citizen of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of three
hundred illegal Chinese immigrants who jumped off
the Golden Venture when it ran aground on a sand
bar in New York Harbor on June 6, 1993. Chen
was fleeing the PRC's population control policy. The
policy limits each family to one child; noncompli-
ance with which is met with punishment and fines.
The PRC had arrested Chen's wife in 1992 when
she was five months pregnant with their third child.
Chen and his wife had violated the country's policy
by already having a second child, although the gov-
ernment had not taken any action based upon this
birth. The PRC forced Chen's wife to abort her third
pregnancy and imposed a 20,000 yuan fine (twelve
times the amount of Chen's annual salary) for the
second child. In July 1992, the PRC forced Chen to
submit to surgical sterilization and threatened to
sterilize his wife unless he paid the fine within five
years. Furthermore, the government removed Chen
from his position clerking at a government owned
food cooperative on a commune for his failure to
attend commune meetings and his refusal to coop-
erate with the commune.2 Thus, Chen was forced
to choose between paying 20,000 yuan when he had
no income, or seeing his wife sterilized by govern-
ment order. Feeling that he had no other recourse,
Chen sailed to the United States on the Golden
Venture, jumped into the water when it ran aground,
and was picked up by a rescue boat before he reached
I Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir.
1995).
2 Chen refused to attend the commune meetings be-
cause he did not want to associate with the Communist
party. He was fired shortly after he declined an offer to
join the Communist party by the head of the commune.
3 Matter of Chang, 1989 WL 24751, *23 (BIA 1989)
(citing 1985 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986), and 1987 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, Joint Committee of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, l OOth Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988).
4 Matter of Chang, 1989 WL 24751, *29 (BIA 1989).
5Id.
6Some of the more gruesome forced abortion prac-
tices documented by researchers on China's policy include
the shore. Upon his arrival in the United States, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) placed
him in detention and initiated exclusion proceedings.
THE PRC POLICY
China holds one-fifth of the world's population
yet has only seven percent of the world's arable land.3
The government has an interest in assuring that its
citizens have adequate housing, education, medical
services, and other benefits. Faced with limited re-
sources, China's leaders have made family planning
a national priority. They believe that land scarcity
and economic modernization are unresolvable with-
out a decline in population growth. Hence, the gov-
ernment aims for the maximum population to be
1.2 billion by the year 2000.4 To achieve this goal,
the government discourages early marriages and
enforces a "one couple-one child" policy. This limits
urban residents to one child per couple unless spe-
cial permission is granted. In no case is a third birth
permissible. The mechanics of implementation-
economic sanctions, peer pressure, and propa-
ganda-are determined locally. The only limitation
on local enforcement is that local officials may not
use physical force to obtain compliance with birth
quotas. Any other mechanism is acceptable to
achieve the state imposed birthrates.5 Couples who
follow through with forbidden pregnancies may suf-
fer the suspension of wages, fines, forced abortions,
6
sterilization, and other sanctions.
the inducement of labor by drugs during late term preg-
nancies and the subsequent injection of formaldehyde into
the baby's brain as it crowns in the birth canal. Nancy L.
Katz, Caught Between Cultures, Mothers Rght for Rights,
Atlanta J. & Constit., May 21, 1995 at D1. Other prac-
tices include inserting a rubber "bulb" into a woman's
uterus during late term pregnancy and filling it with wa-
ter until the pressure induces contractions and premature
stillbirth and injecting "poison shots" into the amniotic
fluid, which poisons the baby and also causes premature
stillbirth. April Adell, Fear of Persecution for Opposition to
Violations of the International Human Right to Found a Fam-
ily as a Legal Entitlement to Asylum for Chinese Refugees,
24 Hofstra L. Rev. 789, n.21 (citing Jeff Jacoby, Clinton's
China Policy: Raw Naked Cruelty, Boston Globe, May 9,
1995, at 19).
Chen applied for political asylum under The
Immigration and Nationality Act,7 based on his op-
position to China's population control policy. The
Board of Immigration Appeals ("Immigration
Board") denied his application for asylum because
he failed to prove persecution "on account of...
political opinion."' Chen brought a writ of habeas
corpus in which he sought review of the Board's
decision, and the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia denied his petition.9
Chen appealed the Immigration Board's decision to
the Fourth Circuit.
II. HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the Immigration Board's
decision and held that severe sanctions for Chen's
violation of China's population control policy did
not constitute persecution resulting from a political
opinion.'0 The court found that the Immigration
Board had no authority to confer asylum when the
PRC took action or threatened to take action against
the asylum applicant merely to enforce its popula-
tion control policy. Such an applicant was not a "refu-
gee" as defined in the Immigration and Nationality
Act."
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A. MATTER OF CHANG
The Fourth Circuit based its decision largely on
a 1989 Immigration Board decision, Matter of
Chang12 Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, ("Refugee Act") an applicant for asylum must
establish persecution, or that a reasonable person in
'8 U.S.C. § 1158.This section of the Immigration and
Nationality Act provides that an alien "may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the
Attorney General determines that such alien is a 'refugee'
within the meaning of section 1101 (a)(42)(A) of this title."
Chen also applied for withholding of deportation under 8
U.S.C. 1253(h).
8Id.
9 Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 858 F. Supp. 569 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
"Chen Zhou Chai, 48 F.3d at 1331.
"18 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(42)(A). The Immigration and
Nationality Act defines "refugee" as: "any person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality, or in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
like circumstances would fear persecution, as a re-
sult of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 3 In
Chang, the Immigration Board ruled that govern-
ment action in furtherance of a coercive population
control policy that includes involuntary sterilization
did not constitute persecution within the meaning
of the Refugee Act.' 4 It further found that an indi-
vidual claiming asylum based on the one couple-
one child policy must establish a well-founded fear
that the policy would be enforced selectively. The
Immigration Board found "no evidence that the goal
of China's policy was other than ... [to control
population]," and that it was not a subterfuge for
persecuting any portion of the Chinese citizenry, on
account of one of the reasons enumerated in the
statute."'- The Immigration Board stated that "imple-
mentation of the 'one couple-one child' policy in
and of itself, even to the extent that involuntary ster-
ilizations may occur, [was] ... not persecution within
the meaning of the Refugee Act, as long as it was
implemented for a general population control rea-
sons."' 6 Thus, an asylum claim based solely on the
fact that the applicant was subjected to this policy
must fail under Chang. The Immigration Board noted
that "whether immigration laws should be amended
to provide temporary relief from deportation to all
individuals who face the possibility of forced steril-
ization as part of a country's population control pro-
gram is a matter for Congress to resolve legisla-
tively."
7
B. EFFORTS TO OVERTURN CHANG
Immediately after the ruling in Chang, Congress
passed the DeConcini Amendment to the Emer-
gency Chinese Immigration ReliefAct of ]989.18 The
protection or that country because of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion."
lzMatterof Chang, 1989WL 24751, *23 (BIA 1989).
"See Matter of Chang 1989 WL 24751, *23 (BIA
1989). See also INS v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987).
1 Matterof Chang, 1989 WL 24751, *25 (BIA 1989).
'lid. at *25.
16Id .
17 d. at *28.
'8 H.R. 2712 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Section 3
of the Act provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
STANDARDS TO BE APPLIED IN ADJUDI-
CATING APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM,
WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION, AND
REFUGEE STATUS FROM CHINESE FLEE-
Amendment provided that opposition to a
government's family planning policy was a political
opinion and, thus, should be grounds for asylum in
the United States. By November 1989, the Senate
had passed the Amendment unanimously,19 and the
House of Representatives had concurred. 20Although
President Bush approved the Amendment, he had
misgivings about other portions of the bill. Viewing
the portions of the bill that related to the PRC's
policy as intrusive of his constitutional and statu-
tory authority, he vetoed the legislation. 2' Subse-
quent congressional vote failed to override the veto.22
President Bush then instructed the Attorney
General to promulgate an interim rule with similar
language and having the same effect as the failed
DeConcini Amendment.23 He ensured the enforce-
ment of the rule through an executive order24 which
provided as follows:
The Secretary of State and the Attorney Gen-
eral are directed to provide for enhanced con-
sideration under the immigration laws for indi-
viduals from any country who express a fear of
persecution upon return to their country related
to that country's policy of forced abortion or
coerced sterilization, as implemented by the
Attorney General's regulation effective Janu-
ary 29, 1990.25
ING COERCIVE POPULATION CONTROL
POLICIES. (a) IN GENERAL.- With respect
to the adjudication of all applicants for asylum,
withholding of deportation, or refugee status
from nationals of China filed before, on, or af-
ter the date of the enactment of this Act, care-
ful consideration shall be given to such an ap-
plicant who expresses a fear of persecution upon
return to China related to China's "one couple,
one child" family planning policy. If the appli-
cant establishes that such applicanthas refused
to abort or be sterilized, such applicant shall be
considered to have established a well-founded
fear of persecution, if returned to China, on the
basis of political opinion consistent with para-
graph (42)(A) of section 1101(a) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.
19135 Cong. Rec. S8241-55 (daily ed. July 19-20, 1989).
2Z135 Cong. Rec. H7945-54 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989).
21 Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, reprinted in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1611-
12 (Nov. 30 1989).
2Although the House voted to override the veto (136
Cong. Rec. H66-67 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1990)), the Senate
failed by falling five votes short of the two thirds majority
(136 Cong. Rec. S382 (Daily Ed. Jan. 25, 1990)).
When the interim rule was published in the Federal
Register, this language regarding family planning
policies was omitted without explanation.
2 6
In 1993, on the last day of the Bush Adminis-
tration, the Attorney General signed a final rule that
provided for asylum based on an applicant's oppo-
sition to his or her country's family planning policy.
The final rule parroted the language of 1990 interim
rule and was to take effect upon publication in the
Federal Register. 7 Following the 1993 inauguration,
President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of any
unpublished regulations so that his own appointees
could approve them. Why the Clinton administra-
tion did not publish the rule later is unclear. None-
theless, the rule was never published and it never
became binding law on the courts. This omission
gave rise to a conflict between Chang and the Bush
Executive Order. Unsure as to how to resolve this
conflict, the Immigration Board referred two of its
decisions to Attorney General Reno, who granted
review. Reno later rescinded her grant of review
without explanation and left the conflict unresolved.
C. THE CHANG DECISION DID NOT
BIND THE CHEN COURT
A court may substitute its own judgment for an
agency's ruling if it finds that the agency's interpre-
23The rule included the following:
(1) Aliens who have a well founded fear that they
will be required to abort a pregnancy or to be ster-
ilized because of their country's family planning
policies may be granted asylum on the ground of
persecution on account of political opinion. (2)
An applicant who establishes that the applicant
(or applicant's spouse) has refused to abort a preg-
nancy or to be sterilized in violation of a country's
family planning policy, and who has a well-founded
fear that he or she will be required to abort the
pregnancy or to be sterilized or otherwise perse-
cuted if the applicant were returned to such coun-
try may be granted asylum.
55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805 (Jan. 29, 1990).
24Exec. Order No. 12,711, § 4, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897
(1990).
2s Exec. Order No. 12,711, § 4, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897.
26The court in Chen characterized this omission as
mere "inadvertence." Chen, 48 F.3d at 1337, n. 4. See also
Gou v. Carroll, 842 F.Supp. 858,869 n. 20 (E.D.Va. 1994)
(citing an article describing the omission of the January
29, 1990 interim rule as "an example of the bureaucratic
left hand not noticing what the bureaucratic right hand is
doing.")
27 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1994). The January 22, 1993
rule would have provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
tation of its regulations is unreasonable.28 Although
a court must give the agency's decision deference, it
also conducts a plenary review of the decision.9 De-
spite the litany of cases that blindly follow Chang.,
3
0
the Chen court should have ignored the Immigra-
tion Board's ruling. First, the legislative history of
the Refugee Act indicates that Congress and the
executive branch intended for opposition to a
country's family planning policy to be construed as
political opinion. Opposition to a country's family
planning policy is unquestionably "political opinion"
within the intended meaning of the Refugee Act,
and the Chang interpretation of the Refugee Act
violates the spirit of United Nations human rights
policies upon which the Act is based. Second, the
notion that Chang's requirement of particularized
persecution is unreasonable in light of the United
States executive's traditional treatment of asylum.
1. POLITICAL OPINION
The heart of the issue is whether opposition to
the PRC's family planning policy constitutes a "po-
litical opinion."When interpreting a statute, a court
ordinarily "must... start with the assumption that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used."3' 1 Political opinion is
defined as:
"The exercise of the functions vested in those
charged with the conduct of government; re-
lating to the management of affairs of state ...
of or pertaining to exercise of rights and privi-
leges or the influence by which individuals of a
state seek to determine or control its public
policy . ".. ,32
(2)(11) An applicant (and the applicant's spouse, if
also an applicant) shall be found to be a refugee on
the basis of a well founded fear of persecution on
account of political opinion if the applicant estab-
lishes a well-founded fear that, pursuant to the
implementation by the country of the applicant's
nationality or last habitual residence of a family
planning policy that involves or results in forced
abortion or coerced sterilization, the applicant will
be forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo steril-
ization, or will be persecuted for failure or refusal
to do so, and that the applicant is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, or to avail himslef or herself of the
protection of, that country because of such fear.
Chen, 48 F.3d at 1337.
2 See Chevron US.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milthollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566-67(1980).
It can hardly be doubted that one's views regard-
ing abortion, whether "pro-life" or "pro-choice"
is a "political opinion". within this definition. The
ordinary meaning of "political opinion" encom-
passes an individual's views regarding procreation.
In fact, the Court has stated that the expression
of one's views on abortion, however expressed,
is "political."
33
Additionally, the legislative history of the Refu-
gee Act indicates that Congress intended for views
regarding procreation and forced sterilization in the
form of opposition to a government's family plan-
ning policy to constitution "political opinion." The
executive and legislative branches have made innu-
merable attempts to include opposition to a
country's population control policy as political opin-
ion. They have failed only for logistical reasons. The
proposed January 1993 Rule specifically stated that
"one effect of this rule is to supersede the decision
Matter of Chang.... "14
In INS v. Elias-Zacharias,35 the United States
Supreme Court specifically stated that it was ap-
propriate to interpret the Refugee Act using an
"analysis of the plain language of the [Refugee] Act,
its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and
its legislative history."36 The Court found these "or-
dinary canons of statutory construction compel-
ling. '37 The Court also noted that "[i]n enacting the
[Refugee Act] . . .Congress sought to 'give the
United States sufficient flexibility to respond to situ-
ations involving political or religious dissidents and
detainees throughout the world." 3 The preamble
to the United Nations Protocol, to which the United
States is a party, states that the purpose for the Refu-
gee Act's enactment was "that new refugee situa-
tions have arisen since the [Refugee] Convention
"9Chen, 48 F.3d at 1342.
3oSee Wang v. Slattery, 877 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y
1995); Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Lan v. Waters, 869 E Supp. 1483 (N.D. Ca. 1994); Gao v.
Waters, 869 E Supp. 1474 (N.D. Ca. 1994); Chen Zhou
Chai, 866 F. Supp. at 283.
31Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); See
also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
32Websters II, New Riverside Dictionary 910 (1984).
33 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815
(1992).
31 Gou Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 864
(1994) (quoting the 1993 Proposed Rule, supra note 27).
31INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
36Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. at 487.
371d. at 487.
3'8 d. at 488. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-608, at 9
(1979)).
was adopted and that the refugees concerned, there-
fore, .may not fall within the scope of the Conven-
tion."39 Hence, construing the Act to be in symme-
try with United States protocol requires it to be in-
terpreted as protecting the fundamental human right
of procreation.
Humans rights law has been consistent with this
notion; the right was formally recognized by the in-
ternational community in 1948 with the promulga-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.40
Artide 16 of the Dedaration states that "[mien and
women of full age ... have the right to ... found a
family."41 The right to found a family has been codi-
fied subsequently in other human rights treaties.
42
Opposition to governmental regulation of re-
production, a fundamental human right, constitutes
"political opinion" within the plain meaning of the
words. The ruling in Chang conflicts with these prin-
ciples. Thus, it is wholly within the judiciary's au-
thority to interpret the Refugee Act broadly to "re-
spond to situations"43 in which human rights are be-
ing violated. The Chang interpretation is not rea-
sonable in light of the legislative and administrative
history of the Refugee Act. Faced with conflicting
administrative interpretations and legislative history,
courts should not engage in'"blind adherence"44 to a
single agency ruling.
2. PARTICULARIZED PERSECUTION
The Chang court's view of "persecution" as re-
quiring "selective enforcement" and excluding any
generally enforced governmental policy is also un-
reasonable.4 The PRC's family planning policy, be-
cause it applies equally to all citizens, is a generally-
applied policy. In Chen, the Fourth Circuit followed
Chang's interpretation of the Refugee Act. The
Fourth Circuit found that even if Chen had suc-
cessfully characterized his failure to comply with
39Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
pmbl. (enforced with respect to the United States Nov. 1,
1968).
40G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d
plen.mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810(1948).
.4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 16, G.A.
Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).4ZSee International Covenant on Civil Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc A/6316 (1966); and Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
the population control policy as a "political opin-
ion," he also would have had to demonstrate that
the PRC's actions or threats against him-even to
the extent that those actions involved forced abor-
tions or sterilizations-were taken for a reason other
than to enforce the general population control
policy. 6 The Fourth Circuit stated that the Chang
interpretation was consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacharia47; how-
ever, the Elias-Zacharias Court did not mention any
"particularization" requirement.
Such an interpretation is at odds with the United
States' traditional treatment of asylum laws. The
United States has, in other circumstances, afforded
asylum to individuals who were persecuted by a
government that enforced a generally-applied gov-
ernment policy. For instance, most totalitarian gov-
ernments such as North Korea, Argentina, Cuba, and
the former Soviet Union, uniformly apply govern-
ment policies against all who challenge the the
government's legitimacy, or who aspire to replace the
government by democratic means. The Refugee Act
contains no requirement of particularized application
for a policy to meet the definition of "political opin-
ion."The Chang interpretation of the Refugee Act to
require selective application of the policy in this case
constitutes an unreasonable addition to the showing
required under the Refugee Act as traditionally un-
derstood and applied by the executive and legislative
branches.
Even if a court determines that it is obligated
to follow Chang, it has another option which would
afford a person such as Chen refugee status. By in-
terpreting the 1993 Rule48 as an interpretive rule,
setting forth a general statement of policy rather than
a substantive rule, the requirement of publication
can be avoided. 49 Although a regulation must be
substantive or legislative to have the force and ef-
fect of law, the Administrative Procedure Act does
1979, art. 16, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm.,
34th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 75, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/
830 (1979).
431INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 488 (1992).
44 United States Trans. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823,
829 (10th Cir. 1986.
4
1MatterofChang 1989WL 24751, *25 (BIA 1989).
46 Chen, 48 .3d at 1343.
47 Elias-Zacharias, 48 F.3d at 1342.
488 C.F.R. § 208.13. For text, see supra note 27.
49 See United States v. Harvey, 659 F.2d 62,64 (5th
Cir. 1981). See also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834
F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Pacific Gas &
Elec. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir.
1974)).
not require the publication of interpretive rules."s
In making a distinction between substantive rules
and interpretive rules, the central question is essen-
tially "whether an agency is exercising its rulemaking
power to clarify an existing statute or regulation, or
to create new law, rights, or duties."5' Because the
1993 Rule could be construed as a legislative at-
tempt at interpreting "political opinion," the courts
could legitimately follow its guidance.
Even the failure to publish a substantive rule is
not necessarily fatal.5 2 Although the Freedom of In-
formation Act ("FOI') mandates that publication
of agency rules,53 the Second Circuit has stated that
the FOIA requirment "attaches only to matters
which if not published would adversely affect a
member of the public" 4 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit has noted, albeit in dicta, that "[w]here the
rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent
upon agencies to follow their own procedures...
even though the procedural requirement has not yet
been published in the federal register."55 Under
Nguyen v. United States56 the Ninth Circuit held that
an unpublished rule is effective unless it adversely
affects a person's substantive rights.57 The Ninth
Circuit stated that courts should consider a variety
of factors in determining whether a non-published
agency rule should be given legal effect, including:
whether or not the unpublished interpretation af-
fects individuals' substantive rights; (ii) whether the
interpretation deviates from the plain meaning of
the statute or regulation at issue; and (iii) whether
the interpretation limits administrative discretion."
Under these factors, the unpublished 1993 Rule
could be entitled to legal effect 59
IV. CONCLUSION
The right to procreate is a fundamental human
right and should be the basis for asylum in the United
States. The Immigration Board and the United States
courts should interpret asylum standards consistently
with the current global trend reflected in international
human rights law. Such a widely recognized interna-
tional human right to procreate must at least imply
the right of parents to decide the size of their family.
"The humanitarian spirit of the Refugee Act requires
that as new violations of human rights emerge, the
definition of refugees who qualify for asylum should
expand to include them."60 Involuntary sterilization is
both a violation of fundamental human rights and a
denial of the right to life, liberty, and security. As Jus-
tice Douglas noted in Skinnerv. Oklahoma, "he power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands, it
can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear."6'
In Chang and Chen, the Immigration Board and
the Fourth Circuit failed to apply these principles
and ruled in direct contravention of the spirit of the
Refugee Act and the regulatory history underlying
these principles in the United States. It also ruled in
direct contravention of International Protocol.
As long as China's coercive enforcement policy
is in place, its subjects should have refugee status in
the United States. Decisions like Chang are errone-
ous and should not be followed by other courts. At
a minimum, counsel should note that the Chen de-
cision and others like it may not present a barrier to
success in arguing that the United States should grant
asylum to victims of China's one couple-one child
policy.
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